(This extract takes 13¾ minutes to read, unfortunately.)
[I]t was neither the persecution nor the enthusiasm that necessarily led to the mass emigration to Israel. Indeed, Jewish persecution occurred in most Middle Eastern and North African countries but usually did not result in the near-total immigration of their Jewish communities to Israel. Even in Egypt, a belligerent state that played a key role in the war against Israel’s establishment, there was no mass exodus to Israel.
It follows that all the above-mentioned characteristics, for all their importance, do not explain the special case of immigration from Libya, Yemen, and Iraq to the State of Israel. To understand this phenomenon it is necessary to examine events in each of these countries, with attention to all the participating players.
[…]
Libya
The first country to undergo mass emigration was Libya, which was within Italy’s sphere of influence and, after its occupation in 1912, became an Italian colony. In January 1943 Tripoli was occupied by the British, who established a military régime in the country.
Six years later, in January 1949, in the context of negotiations over the British withdrawal and Libya’s pending independence, Britain announced that the country’s gates would be opened for Jews seeking to leave.⁴⁵ Apparently, the British were concerned about the steadily deteriorating relations between Jews and Muslims and preferred to let the Jews leave immediately, rather than face future rioting based on religious hostility, economic competition, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁶
During this period, with the British Mandate in Palestine having ended and Israel having achieved statehood, the British, who had prevented Jewish immigration during the 1940s (as part of their 1939 “White Paper” policy), did not oppose the relocation of Libya’s Jews to Israel. On the contrary, this land now offered a solution to the Jewish problem in Arab countries. Israel’s stated policy of opening its gates to Jews made it clear to the British that it would not refuse the Jews of Libya.
In the talks leading up to Libya’s independence, the JDC, alongside other Jewish organizations, played an important part in negotiating the rights of Italian and Jewish minority groups in an independent Libya. The negotiators included Libya’s British rulers and representatives of local parties expected to assume leadership upon independence.
It became evident that the future leaders were unwilling to commit to equal rights for Jews, despite their status as nationals and even though the Jewish community had existed in the country for many centuries.⁴⁷ The failure of these negotiations made clear to Jewish organizations, and particularly to U.S. Jewry, the State of Israel, and Libya’s Jews themselves, that emigration was imperative.
The British announcement of January 1949 sparked enthusiasm among thousands of Jews, who approached local authorities seeking to arrange their exit to Israel. Most of these applicants were Jews who had not managed to recover from the adverse impact of the anti-Semitic policies implemented during World War II, or from the fierce attacks that took place under British rule, and who now feared anti-Jewish policies at the hands of an independent Arab government. Hundreds of them reached Italy, which had previously served as a stop on the illegal immigration route into Israel during its war of independence.⁴⁸
The emigrants from Libya joined displaced Jews from Europe — Holocaust survivors — in Jewish Agency transit camps, and from there they were transported to Israel. When the vast scale of immigrants expected to arrive from Libya became apparent, Israel dispatched delegates to Tripoli to make arrangements in accordance with quotas set by the Jewish Agency and the Israeli Health Ministry.
The JDC played an important role in this process. It had already begun operating in Libya in 1945, in an effort to rehabilitate the Jewish community following the hardships suffered during World War II and as a result of rioting. The JDC began providing economic, educational, and medical assistance to the Jewish community, while also increasing cooperative efforts with the Zionist movement.
In light of the political changes in Libya and the throngs of Jews seeking to leave the country, the JDC joined the operation to bring Libya’s Jews to Israel, assuming the responsibility for funding as well as medical screening and treatment for the ill. This was particularly important, as Israel barred entry to the contagiously ill, demanding that they be treated before entering the country, and objected to receiving anyone with a severe chronic illness. Medical screening and healthcare took place in Libya, in cooperation with the Jewish healthcare organization OZE.⁴⁹
All these activities were conducted with the knowledge and assistance of the British: they permitted the Jewish Agency to manage the transport operation from Tripoli, allowed direct passage of ships from the port of Tripoli to Haifa, and even assisted Libyan Jews in transferring capital and property.⁵⁰
During the years 1949–1952, thirty thousand Jews arrived in Israel from Libya. But while Libyan Jews and Jewish Agency representatives may have presumed that the exodus would conclude within a few months, it eventually turned out to be a three-year process that concluded only after Libya achieved independence. It was Israel that determined the pace of immigration, in accordance with assessments of the situation in Libya and the pressures of potential Jewish immigration from other countries.
When it became evident that Libya would not be achieving independence until late 1951, and therefore the evacuation of Jews was not a matter of urgency, the immigration quotas for Libyan Jews were reduced. This made it possible to give priority to other Jewish communities, including those in Yemen and Iraq, whose circumstances were seen as more ominous and their immigration therefore more urgent. Once concluded, the immigration from Libya left a small Jewish community of about 6,000 in Tripoli, primarily property owners belonging to the socio-economic elite who chose to stay.⁵¹
Yemen
Like the immigration from Libya, immigration from Yemen was originally intended to be a gradual process, but in contrast to the Libyan case it turned into a matter of urgency necessitating immediate, mass evacuation. Immigration began in December 1948, when a few thousand Jews were airlifted to Israel. In fact, they had left Yemen years earlier and spent the intervening time waiting in a refugee camp, Hashed (or “Geula” — redemption — in Hebrew) in the heart of the desert in the British colony of Aden. Following their departure the camp was destroyed, an indication of the firm British stance against any future transit of Jews from Yemen.⁵²
The British, Aden’s rulers, sought to put an end to a pattern that had taken place during the previous decade when many of these would-be immigrants remained in Aden as destitute refugees. In late April 1949, Imam Ahmed granted the Jews permission to leave the country, on the condition that they sell their property, which they indeed did — at a very low cost — to their Muslim neighbors or the Imam’s representatives.⁵³
The entire process appears to have been coordinated between the Yemeni ruler and the British authorities in Aden, as evidenced by a British proposal put forward two weeks later: to open a land corridor between Yemen and Aden and allow Jews entry to a new transit camp (Hashed B), to be established within the jurisdiction of the colony and serve as a way station en route to Aden’s airport and from there to Israel.
On the basis of this proposal, the British conducted negotiations with Israel and the JDC regarding arrangements for the transport of Jews from Aden to Israel.⁵⁴ The British proposal sought to avoid the recurrence of a Jewish refugee problem in the city of Aden by ensuring that Jews did not pass through it. At the same time, such an exodus, like the process concurrently underway in Libya, was intended to reduce or even resolve the problem of the Jewish minority in imamate Yemen and the entire southern region of Yemen, which as noted was under direct or indirect British control.
Subsequent events also point to cooperation between the Imam and the British. Within Yemen, the operation was overseen by the Imam, while in the two (eastern and western) protectorates between Yemen and Aden it was coordinated by British advisors who effectively controlled these regions. They supervised the sites where departing Jews were concentrated, ensured the supply of food and equipment, arranged for the trucks that would transport the emigrants to the transit camp in Aden, and took measures to protect the Jews’ lives.
In traveling across different regions, the Jews had to pay steep transit fees, particularly in the protectorates, and some became targets of highwaymen. Most of them arrived in Aden penniless and destitute.⁵⁵
Like Libya’s Jews, they lacked passports, and their only possible destination was Israel. Israel initially sought to regulate immigration and prevent the influx of contagiously ill newcomers, to no avail; the rapid pace of departure and massive scale of emigration were dictated by Yemen’s and Aden’s governing authorities, and Israel had to adjust its immigration policy and improvise solutions for immigrant reception.
In an exceptional move, relative to its other immigration operations, Israel entrusted the transport of Yemen’s Jews to the JDC, a philanthropic organization that was not subordinate to the Israeli government and did not always fully cooperate with it. A failure to grasp the massive and immediate scale of immigration led to poor planning of the airlift and inadequate investment in preparing the transit camp in Aden.⁵⁶
Moreover, in contrast to Libya, Imamate Yemen did not grant the operation’s organizers a foothold in the country, and the Jews therefore had to make their own transport arrangements; they were unable to coordinate with representatives of Israel and the JDC in Aden, received no assistance in the form of information or funding, and were entirely dependent on the Imam’s agents and the British.
Thus the responsibility for organizing their journey and determining their fate fell exclusively to each of the individual men and women who embarked on the journey. Such a pattern also characterized the immigration from Yemen two decades earlier, but after Israel’s establishment, this was an exceptional situation, unparalleled by any immigration operations in Europe or other Arab countries during those years.
The operation took a heavy toll and claimed many lives during the difficult trek through Yemen, particularly after most of the emigrants contracted malaria while moving through southern Yemen. The transit camp could not accommodate the vast numbers of those awaiting departure over the course of several weeks, and hundreds died at the camp and were buried in a cemetery established adjacent to it.
The catastrophic situation worsened in late September, after the British closed the border crossings and conditioned the continued entry of Jews to Aden on the departure to Israel of thousands of emigrants still waiting in the transit camp. The consequences were severe: about ten thousand emigrants were stranded in the arid desert region of southern Yemen over the course of five weeks without enough water, food, or medicine. Hundreds of them died on the site and many remained sick and disabled.⁵⁷
The situation compelled Israel to launch a rescue operation. It brought Yemen’s Jews to the country without any medical screening, within a very brief span of time, despite knowing that many of the immigrants had contagious diseases. Yemeni immigrants only began to receive medical care after arriving in Israel, and the treatment took place within isolated, fenced immigrant camps in which the new arrivals were placed.
At these camps, they were examined and given medical and rehabilitative care — all under conditions of hardship and poor sanitation that included shortages in food, equipment, and medical personnel. These circumstances had severe repercussions for the absorption of Yemeni immigrants into Israel.⁵⁸
Iraq
The mass immigration of some 120,000 Jews from Iraq, which began in May 1950 and peaked in the spring and summer of 1951, came as a great surprise. It ran counter to the expectations surrounding this wealthy, well-established community, which had enjoyed civil rights and been engaged and integrated in economic, social, and cultural activities in Iraq. To understand this phenomenon, let us examine the circumstances of Iraq’s Jews in the two years preceding their emigration and during the emigration period itself.
As noted above, the political and economic persecution that Iraqi Jews experienced during 1948–1949 undermined their sense of security and cast doubt on their place in Iraq. But no less worrisome were reports that circulated in the Iraqi press in 1949 about plans for a population and property exchange between 100,000 Jewish citizens of Iraq and 100,000 Palestinian refugees. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said initially proposed a plan along these lines in early 1949, but the British objected, not because they opposed the transfer of Jewish citizens but for fear that such an exchange would escalate into a Jewish expulsion.⁵⁹
Shortly thereafter British diplomatic missions to the Middle East launched a series of talks in which they reexamined this proposal, posing additional suggestions about mutual compensation for the loss of property. They concluded these discussions by observing that, notwithstanding concerns about complications in implementing the plan, “the elimination of certain minorities might lead to more stabilities and better relations in the Middle East.”⁶⁰
These conclusions were recorded at a time when the transport of Jews from Libya and Yemen to Israel was in full swing. The summary documents reveal that British Foreign Office officials supported a population and property exchange but were unwilling to initiate or lead it: “The essence of the scheme is prior agreement between Iraq and Israel and that until such agreement is reached we should be well advised to steer clear.”⁶¹ Perhaps they were wary of bearing the responsibility for such an operation, or of failure and criticism, and perhaps they were driven by other concerns. The British involvement has not yet been explored in depth, nor have imperialist interests and repercussions of the Cold War been thoroughly examined.
The population exchange proposal was considered by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, which visited the Middle East in the autumn of 1949 in an effort to resolve the refugee problem, and was unofficially presented to Israel as well.⁶²
Although Israel found the proposal unappealing, given that Iraqi Jews would apparently have to abandon their property, it was compelled to consent because the talks were overshadowed by the ongoing persecution of Zionists in Iraq and because Israel was in the midst of a propaganda campaign against Iraq.⁶³ The issue was receiving frequent coverage in Iraq’s nationalist right-wing press, alongside calls for the expulsion of Jews,⁶⁴ and the fact that Iraqi authorities did not censor these announcements was, possibly, even more distressing to the Jews than the announcements themselves.
In December 1949, the government of Nuri al-Said fell, and the new prime minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, proposed a different solution to the Jewish problem: neither forced transfer nor deportation, but rather the regulation of Jewish departure by means of a new law — the Denaturalization Law.
The law, which would only remain in effect for one year, allowed Jews to leave Iraq in a legal and regulated manner on the condition that they relinquish their Iraqi nationality and the right to return to Iraq. It did not mention Jewish property.
Notwithstanding its problematic provisions, the law was not intended to prompt mass deportation. It was based on assessments that the number of emigration registrants would not exceed a few thousand unemployed young Jews, communists, and Zionists — groups that had already been departing the country illegally. Moreover, registration was voluntary. The purpose of this law was to highlight the loyalty to Iraq among a majority of Iraqi Jews, who were expected to opt to remain.⁶⁵
Contrary to expectations, however, the law actually exacerbated the Jewish problem in Iraq: thousands of Jews began to prepare for departure, which contributed to economic instability and, subsequently, anti-Jewish propaganda. This, in turn, drove additional Jews to plan for departure, sparking a pattern of “rolling emigration”⁶⁶: rising numbers of registrants drew even more people — relatives, neighbors, and friends.
By September 1950, when Nuri al-Said assumed the premiership again, the number of emigration registrants had reached 70,000, although at this point only 10,000 had actually emigrated while the remaining 60,000 Jews still awaited transport to Israel. The delay in the departure of Iraq’s Jews stemmed from Israeli policy, which at that time granted priority to immigration from Romania, and from the difficulties Israel faced in absorbing such large numbers of immigrants.
Al-Said demanded that those awaiting departure leave immediately and threatened their expulsion, which intensified the Jews’ sense of insecurity, leading to ever-growing numbers of emigration registrants. The evacuation itself took place primarily over the course of four months, from March to July 1951. In all, about 105,000 Jews traveled by airlift from Iraq to Israel, and another 15,000 reached Israel via Iran — a total of 120,000. By the time the immigration operation concluded, in late 1951, fewer than 10,000 Jews remained in Iraq.⁶⁷
Although the British had not proactively participated in Iraq’s legislative initiative to permit Jewish departure — indeed, the British ambassador learned about it only a few days before its submission to parliament — they nevertheless supported it and took part in the actual exodus of Jews throughout the entire process. They provided an airport in Cyprus for a stopover on the way to Israel, permitted the American company Alaska Airlines to provide the travel arrangements even though they would have preferred British airlines, and throughout the operation conveyed messages between Israel and Iraq to ensure that the airlift ran smoothly.⁶⁸
An analysis of these events does not indicate that an Iraqi-British plan to expel the Jews ever existed, but as far as Iraq’s Jews were concerned that is effectively what happened. The financial adversities they experienced in the two years preceding the law’s passage, mass layoffs from government ministries and public companies, insecurity and loss of governmental protection, the knowledge that the British, too, supported their departure from Iraq, and the fact that the law would only be in force for one year — a restriction that forced many to make a fateful decision under conditions of uncertainty — combined to make the Jews of Iraq lose any hope for a better future.
Thus, the Denaturalization Law, enacted in order to regulate the status of Iraq’s Jews, became a trap: it undermined their status and resulted in a mass exodus. Moreover, had they wanted to, the Iraqi authorities could have rescinded the law and prevented the mass departure of Jews, but in fact they acted to expedite the process.
Throughout this period, Iraq’s Jews were aware of the prevailing economic hardship in Israel, but this was the only emigration option available to them and was preferable to staying in Iraq. Perhaps they assumed that Israel promised a better future for their children, perhaps they hoped that they would be able to transfer at least some of their property, and certainly they did not imagine how steep the economic and social cost of displacement would be.⁶⁹
Those who ultimately profited the most from this affair were the Iraqi authorities. A mass exodus of Jews resolved the problem of a Jewish minority without Iraq having to absorb a reciprocal number of Palestinian refugees. The same held for matters of property: in March 1951, when the Denaturalization Law expired but the emigration process was in full swing, Iraq nationalized the emigrants’ property, without transferring any of the proceeds to Palestinian refugees whose property Israel had nationalized.⁷⁰ Because of the manner in which these events unfolded, Iraq never came to be seen as responsible for the emigration of Jews.
The highly surprising nature of Iraqi Jews’ mass exodus subsequently spawned a conspiracy theory in Iraq and Israel, according to which the State of Israel and its Zionist envoys in Iraq were responsible for several acts of terror that took place in Baghdad during the emigration period, killing five Jews and injuring dozens. The theory held that these events, aimed at provoking panic, were the cause of the mass emigration.⁷¹ Although there is no verified information about the identity of the perpetrators, an examination of the timing of the events indicates that they could not have been a meaningful contributing factor in the departure of Jews.
(Emphasis added.)