Under the pretext of cultural cooperation, China sends propaganda officials to Europe and Estonia to promote a carefully crafted “China story.” The ISS [Estonian Internal Security Service] wrote that this cultural engagement diverts attention from human rights abuses, unfair economic practices, and growing support for Russia in the war against Ukraine.
The Chinese Embassy in Estonia has stepped up cultural outreach by organizing events with local governments. Alongside these events, meetings are held with local political and business elites, providing favorable opportunities to establish contacts and shape attitudes toward China.
According to the ISS (opens pdf), efforts to cultivate a positive attitude begin with young people. For example, the Chinese ambassador is a frequent guest at Estonian general education schools and universities.
…
The ISS noted that last year the embassy published several native advertising articles in the media of Estonia and other Baltic states about “democracy,” “fair” trade and Taiwan’s “historical” status as part of China, even though the Chinese Communist Party has never governed Taiwan.
…
The embassy also pays local companies for media and public relations services to mediate contacts with Estonian journalists and find outlets willing to publish its articles.
…
According to the ISS, Chinese intelligence activities focus on science, technology and security. After establishing contact via LinkedIn, Chinese intelligence services attempt to lure influential individuals by inviting them to China or its neighboring countries. Travel to China creates recruitment opportunities.
…
The ISS separately highlighted the Estonian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce established in 2022, which has targeted Estonia’s technology sector and contacted several startup and technology companies with proposals for lucrative cooperation with China. The proposals were not sent to company executives or general addresses but specifically to individuals responsible for technology. The founders of the chamber also sought to establish contacts with European Union institutions.
…
In 2025, the use of professional work platforms such as LinkedIn intensified in identifying intelligence targets, the ISS noted. As a new trend, instead of sending personalized messages, job advertisements are posted, and potential candidates are then contacted based on them.
Among candidates, work experience in government service and in the fields of foreign or security policy is particularly valued. Cooperation offers have been made to Estonian politicians, diplomats, ministry officials, members of the Defense League, researchers and others, the ISS wrote.
China has also begun using job advertisements more broadly. For example, in November last year, the United Kingdom’s security service MI5 issued a spying alert to the UK Parliament and its staff, warning about Chinese recruiters and citing two LinkedIn accounts as examples. As early as October 2023, the head of MI5 stated that nearly 20,000 Britons had been contacted via LinkedIn.