Some agencies insist suspects do not have access to those rights if certain conditions apply, such as being within one hundred miles of a US border (such as a coast),
It seems kinda nuanced tho. From various sources, the rules look like this. Ofc sometimes the rules may not be followed, that’s a separate issue. This is just the rules CBP has,
CBP agents can, with no cause, perform a “basic search”. That means looking through photos, text messages, call logs, and emails. But not using tools or forensic methods.
CBP CANNOT compel you to unlock the device for them or produce a pw. They CAN confescate the device if you don’t, tho.
CBP agents CANNOT perform a forensic search without reasonable suspicion and a signoff from a supervisor. A forensic search is one that uses external tools, not just the agent eyeballing your photos and messages after you unlock it for them.
CBP agents CAN perform a forsensic search with reasonable suspicion, and a supervisor signoff.
CBP CANNOT access cloud data from your device. Only data on the device is in bounds.
CBP MUST follow a special protocol if the owner asserts certain privileges, such as attorney client priviledge, or protected medical data.
This leaves travelers in a position where they CAN assert their 4A rights when it comes to data on the device. But it comes at a price. It may lead to the confescation of the device. That is coersive ofc, and many ppl won’t want to. So in practice, many ppl will cooperate and unlock the dev for the agent. But if you really want to push back, you can, and they have to let you into the country still if you are a citizen.
For most Americans, it would take a lawyer present just to know what is safe to do while under arrest.
The problem is, SCOTUS has already ruled on this in 1985, via the good faith exception. If a police officer mistakenly violates your fourth-amendment rights, but did so in good faith, then evidence of any crime found is inadmissible. It’s very difficult to prove bad faith, and officers have learned to lie to cover up, say, that they knew they were crossing a line, or were motivated by corruption, bigotry or ideology to fish for evidence beyond the scope of a reasonable search.
Besides which, I wouldn’t trust an officer to turn off data before combing though my phone, and the difference between what is on the phone and what is cloud data is transparent. They would absolutely have access to my entire email history of decades, and law enforcement has intrinsic personal cause to fish for criminal activity.
For one thing, collars is how police officers get accolades and promotions. And for another, there’s the matter of asset forfeiture. Police routinely will declare any open cash or valuable property as criminal in order to confiscate it. And it’s very difficult to get it back. In the 2010s some precincts already had the capability to empty pre-loaded credit cards, so it wouldn’t surprise me if they could do something similar with mobile payment services.
In the US since the aughts, law enforcement departments have regarded the public as enemy, and this shows up countless times in uncovered intra-department memorandums. It also shows up in precinct suspicious activity guidelines that are contradictory and include all possible forms of behavior (including inaction). It also shows up in police tools like poorly-trained detection dogs who signal at a 90%+ false positive rate, or the two-dollar roadside drug test that false positives on dozens of inert chemicals, such as donut sugar glaze.
In the twentieth century, I would hypothesize over 50% of our incarcerated are innocent, or are serving a sentence disproportionate to the alleged crime they committed. Of course we’re now in the era of random abductions and detention centers run by private prison companies.
It seems kinda nuanced tho. From various sources, the rules look like this. Ofc sometimes the rules may not be followed, that’s a separate issue. This is just the rules CBP has,
CBP agents can, with no cause, perform a “basic search”. That means looking through photos, text messages, call logs, and emails. But not using tools or forensic methods.
CBP CANNOT compel you to unlock the device for them or produce a pw. They CAN confescate the device if you don’t, tho.
CBP agents CANNOT perform a forensic search without reasonable suspicion and a signoff from a supervisor. A forensic search is one that uses external tools, not just the agent eyeballing your photos and messages after you unlock it for them.
CBP agents CAN perform a forsensic search with reasonable suspicion, and a supervisor signoff.
CBP CANNOT access cloud data from your device. Only data on the device is in bounds.
CBP MUST follow a special protocol if the owner asserts certain privileges, such as attorney client priviledge, or protected medical data.
This leaves travelers in a position where they CAN assert their 4A rights when it comes to data on the device. But it comes at a price. It may lead to the confescation of the device. That is coersive ofc, and many ppl won’t want to. So in practice, many ppl will cooperate and unlock the dev for the agent. But if you really want to push back, you can, and they have to let you into the country still if you are a citizen.
For most Americans, it would take a lawyer present just to know what is safe to do while under arrest.
The problem is, SCOTUS has already ruled on this in 1985, via the good faith exception. If a police officer mistakenly violates your fourth-amendment rights, but did so in good faith, then evidence of any crime found is inadmissible. It’s very difficult to prove bad faith, and officers have learned to lie to cover up, say, that they knew they were crossing a line, or were motivated by corruption, bigotry or ideology to fish for evidence beyond the scope of a reasonable search.
Besides which, I wouldn’t trust an officer to turn off data before combing though my phone, and the difference between what is on the phone and what is cloud data is transparent. They would absolutely have access to my entire email history of decades, and law enforcement has intrinsic personal cause to fish for criminal activity.
For one thing, collars is how police officers get accolades and promotions. And for another, there’s the matter of asset forfeiture. Police routinely will declare any open cash or valuable property as criminal in order to confiscate it. And it’s very difficult to get it back. In the 2010s some precincts already had the capability to empty pre-loaded credit cards, so it wouldn’t surprise me if they could do something similar with mobile payment services.
In the US since the aughts, law enforcement departments have regarded the public as enemy, and this shows up countless times in uncovered intra-department memorandums. It also shows up in precinct suspicious activity guidelines that are contradictory and include all possible forms of behavior (including inaction). It also shows up in police tools like poorly-trained detection dogs who signal at a 90%+ false positive rate, or the two-dollar roadside drug test that false positives on dozens of inert chemicals, such as donut sugar glaze.
In the twentieth century, I would hypothesize over 50% of our incarcerated are innocent, or are serving a sentence disproportionate to the alleged crime they committed. Of course we’re now in the era of random abductions and detention centers run by private prison companies.